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EXISTENCE OF A SUICIDE PACT AS A COMPLETE DEFENSE
TO A SURVIVOR'S CRIMINAL LIABILITY: STATE V. SAGE
If thou and nature can so gently part
The stroke of death is as a lover's pinch,
Which hurts, and is desired.I
Can one who encourages another's suicide through a suicide pact be ab-
solved of criminal liability? The Ohio Supreme Court answered this question
in the affirmative in State v. Sage. 2 The court held that a suicide survivor's
proof that another's death resulted from a mutual suicide pact acts as a com-
plete defense to criminal liability.3 Not since 1872 has the Ohio Supreme Court
discussed criminal liability for suicide pact members who aid and abet another's
suicide.' The Sage court did not differentiate between classic suicide pacts where
each member agrees to commit suicide, and suicide-murder pacts where one
person agrees to commit suicide and the other consents to murder.
SAGE FACTS AND HOLDING
This case came before the Ohio Supreme Court following two appellate
court reversals of Roy H. Sage's aggravated murder convictions.5 In the second
appeal, the Franklin County Court of Appeals held, inter alia, that the trial
court committed reversible error when it refused to charge the jury on the lesser
included offense of involuntary manslaughter, and instead charged only on the
offense of aggravated murder.6 The Ohio Supreme Court reversed this holding,
explaining that the existence of a suicide pact acted as a complete defense to
any crime of homicide under Ohio law.7 Hence, if the jury believed the defen-
dant's suicide defense, he would not be found guilty of either aggravated murder
or involuntary manslaughter.
On February 22, 1982, police responded to a reported shooting at Catherine
Wanner's apartment.8 Upon entering the premises, they found Wanner and Sage
lying on her bed 9 Wanner died from gunshot wounds to her left temple and
left chest.' 0 Sage survived but suffered superficial head and abdominal gun-
'W. SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF ANTONY AND CLEOPATRA, Act. V, Scene II.
2 State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St. 3d 174, 510 N.E.2d 343 (1987).
31d. at 178-179, 510 N.E.2d at 346-347.
4The last Ohio Supreme Court case to address the subject of criminal liability for suicide pact survivors
was Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146 (1872).
5Sage, 31 Ohio St. 3d at 175-76, 510 N.E.2d at 345.
61d. at 176, 510 N.E.2d at 345.
7 1d. at 179, 510 N.E.2d at 347.
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shot wounds."t
Sage claimed that he and Wanner were lovers, and that they agreed to a
suicide pact whereby he shot himself and she shot herself.' 2 The prosecution
argued that Sage either shot Wanner, or that Wanner shot herself under duress.'3
The Ohio Supreme Court omitted the trial court's exact jury instructions
in its opinion, but held that the trial court's refusal to charge the jury on the
lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter was not reversible error.'
4
The court explained that neither suicide, nor aiding and abetting suicide, is
a crime in Ohio. Thus, they reasoned that the existence of a suicide pact acted
as a complete defense to any crime of homicide under Ohio law.
15
SUICIDE LAW HISTORY
Early English courts punished suicide as murder.' 6 Public officials buried
the suicide victim in a public highway and drove a stake through the corpse
to assure that the body would not rise again.' 7 Afterwards, the crown confiscated
the suicide victim's property.'8 Since English lawmakers considered suicide self-
murder, they considered surviving suicide pact members attempted murderers.' 9
In 1961 Parliament enacted the English Suicide Act, which abolished criminal
penalties for suicide.20
American courts expressly rejected the early English view which considered
suicide murder.2' American lawmakers adopted the position that a suicide at-
tempt is a symptom of mental illness, and punishment of such an involuntary
symptom is futile.22 The American view, however, can lead to unintended con-
sequences. Although lawmakers may find no reason to punish the person who
I11d.
12Id.
13 To establish his theory that Wanner was either murdered or had committed suicide under duress, the
prosecutor introduced evidence to show a crossed out portion of Wanner's alleged suicide note which read
"But th -- guy wants to kill me." Another part of the note stated "I wanted to die with you Roy,' only
the word "you" was crossed out. The suicide note was written on the reverse side of a sexually explicit
love note to Sage, written in the third person as though it was dictated.
'
4Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d at 179, 510 N.E.2d at 347.
151d.
161Brenner, Undue Influence in the Criminal Law: A Proposed Analysis of the Criminal Offense of "Caus-
ing Suicide," 47 ALB. L. REV. 62, 64 (1982). See also Hales v. Petit, I Plowd 253, 75 Eng. Rep. 387
(C.B. 1565) for a typical early English suicide case.
17See WILLIAMSTHE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW. 257-61 (1970). See generally Mikell, Is
Suicide Murder?, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 379 (1903).
'
8Brenner, supra note 16, at 64.
/91d. at 85 (citing Regina v. Alison, 8 Car. & Payne 418, 173 Eng. Rep 557 (1838); Rex v. Dyson, 168
Eng. Rep 930 (1823)).
2 0Barry, Suicide and the Law, 5 MELB. U.L. REV. 1, 7 (1965).
21 Markson, The Punishment of Suicide - A Need for Change, 14 VILL. L. REV. 463, 465 (1969); Burnett
v. People, 204 11. 208, 222, 68 N.E. 505, 510 (1903).
22 Bergler, Suicide: Psychoanalytic and Medicolegal Aspects, 8 LA. L. REV. 504, 533 (1908) (citing East,
Suicide from the Medico-Legal Aspect, BRIT. MED. J. (Aug. 8, 1931) ).
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attempts suicide, it does not follow that society should not deter and punish
those people who aid, abet, and advise suicide.23
How can courts impose criminal sanctions on a defendant who aids and
abets a non-criminal suicide? Many jurisdictions declare suicide an illegal or
criminal act, but impose no penalty for it.24 Other states simply recognize that
encouraging suicide is a felony, but that suicide is no crime.25
Possible suicide related criminal charges against non-victims fall into three
general categories: 1) causing suicide; 26 2) aiding and abetting suicide; 27 and
3) supporting suicide through a mutual suicide pact.28
The most culpable suicide related crime is causing suicide. Commonwealth
v. Bowen 29 was the first American case to discuss the concept of proximate
cause as it relates to suicide. That case concerned a prisoner who encouraged
a fellow inmate to hang himself.30 The jury found Bowen not guilty, after the
judge instructed the jury that Bowen could not be convicted as a principal for
the deceased's self-murder, if the deceased would have committed suicide without
Bowen's encouragement.3'
The Bowen court laid the groundwork for today's crime of causing suicide.3 2
In this crime the defendant's will replaces that of the suicide victim's. 33 If the
victim acts voluntarily, the defendant is absolved of criminal liability. The Model
Penal Code provides a typical causing suicide statute.34 It imposes liability for
criminal homicide only if the defendant purposely causes suicide through the
use of force, duress, or deception. 35 To prove the crime of causing suicide, the
prosecution must show that the defendant imposed his will on the victim.
An aider and abettor, however, merely assists the victim in carrying out
his or her original intention.36 The Model Penal Code considers purposeful
aiding or soliciting suicide a second degree felony, if such act actually causes
2 3The Ohio Supreme Court failed to address this important distinction in Sage.
24 Markson, supra note 21.
21See, e.g., Burnett, 204 Ill. at 208, 68 N.E. at 505.
26See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356 (1816).
27See, e.g., People v. Roberts, 211 Mich. 187, 178 NW. 690 (1920).
"See, e.g., People v. Matlock, 51 Cal. 2d 682, 336 P.2d 505 (1959).
29 13 Mass. 356 (1816).
30 1d. at 356-57.
31Id. at 358.
32 See the following statutes that impose criminal penalties for causing suicide. HAwAii REV. STAT. § 707-702
(b) (1985); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.35 (McKinney 1975): PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2505 (Purdon 1983).
3 3 Brenner, supra note 16, at 63.
S4M.P.C. § 210.05 (I) (1980).
35 Id.
36 Brenner. supra note 16. at 63.
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a suicide or attempted suicide.3 7 Otherwise, purposeful aiding and soliciting
suicide is a misdemeanor. 8
Most states classify aiding and abetting suicide as murder or manslaughter. 9
A minority of jurisdictions impose no criminal liability for aiding and abetting
suicide.40
The landmark Ohio case on the subject is Blackburn v. State, 4' decided
in 1872. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the defendant's earlier murder con-
viction and remanded the case to the lower court, but only because of an eviden-
tiary question which would not have affected the court's reasoning regarding
the defendant's culpability.4
2
In Blackburn, the defendant was convicted of administering poison to the
deceased as part of a suicide pact.43 The defendant reneged on the pact and
never took the poison himself.44 The court admitted that suicide was no crime
in Ohio~5 Thus, the defendant could not be convicted either as an accessory
or as a principle in the second degree of suicide.46 The court reasoned that
the crime in issue was not suicide, but the administration of poison which was
specifically prohibited by an Ohio statute.4 7 The court explained that the de-
ceased's willingness to take the poison was immaterial.48 The law prohibited
the administration of poison to anyone, regardless of the victim's state of mindV9
In People v. Roberts, 50 a Michigan court convicted another defendant of
first degree murder for supplying his suicidal wife with poison.5 ' The defen-
dant argued that he could not be convicted as an accessory before the fact of
suicide, since suicide was no crime in Michigan. 2 The court rejected this reason-
ing, saying the defendant was charged with administering poison, not with
-7M.P.C. § 210.5 (2) (1980).
38 Id.
39 See generally Derrick, Criminal Liability for Death of Another as Result of Another's Attempt to Kill
Self or Assist Another's Suicide, 40 A.L.R. 4th 702, Sec. 6 (1985).
40Markson, supra note 21, at 473-74.
4'23 Ohio St. 146 (1872).
421d. at 165-66. The lower court's rejection of testimony which tended to show the deceased's suicidal
disposition was held to be reversible error.







50211 Mich. 187, 178 NW. 690 (1920).
11 Id. at 199, 178 N.W. at 694. In People v Cambell, 124 Mich. App. 333, 337, 335 N.W.2d 27, 29 (1983),
a lower appellate court held that Roberts no longer represented Michigan law and that a defendant who
aids and abets suicide cannot be considered a murderer.
52Roberts, 211 Mich. at 196-97, 178 N.W. at 693.
[Vol. 21:2
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 21 [1988], Iss. 2, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol21/iss2/4
suicide.53
Other states consider aiding and abetting suicide to be manslaughter.54 In
Persampieri v. Commonwealth, 15 the court upheld the defendant's conviction
of involuntary manslaughter for recklessly encouraging his wife's suicide.5 6 The
defendant told his wife he wanted a divorce and she threatened suicide.57 In-
stead of discouraging his wife, the defendant dared her to kill herself, loaded
the household rifle, and taught her how to pull the trigger.58 The defendant knew
his wife had been drinking and was emotionally upset.5 9 The court felt the jury
could reasonably conclude that the defendant's actions constituted reckless dis-
regard for life and upheld the defendant's involuntary manslaughter conviction.6 °
In a similar case, an Iowa court upheld the defendant's conviction for in-
voluntary manslaughter for preparing and providing the suicide weapon.6 1 Again,
the victim was known to be intoxicated and suicidal.62 The court felt the defen-
dant's actions fit the state statute's definition of involuntary manslaughter, since
the actions were "likely to cause death or serious injury." 63 Defendant argued
that he was not criminally liable, since suicide was not a crime under Iowa
law.64 The court rejected this defense, saying that the defendant could be con-
victed of homicide without being considered an accessory or principle in the
second degree to suicide.6 s
A few states impose no criminal liability for aiding and abetting suicide.66
In Sanders v. State, 67 a Texas court held that supplying a suicide victim with
poison was not criminal, but that one who actually administers such poison
to the suicide victim is guilty of murder.68
"Id. See the following cases where the court considered aiding and abetting suicide to be murder. Com-
monwealth v. Hicks, 118 Ky. 637, 82 SW. 265 (1904): State v. Jones, 86 S.C. 17, 67 S.E. 160 (1910): Aven
v. State, 102 Tex. Crim 478, 277 S.W 1080 (1925).
54See, e.g., People v. Kent, 41 Misc. 191, 83 N.Y.S. 948 (1903): State v. Ludwig. 70 Mo. 412 (1879). over-
ruled on other grounds, State v. Fitzgerald, 130 Mo. 407, 32 S.W. 1113 (1895).
55343 Mass. 19, 175 N.E.2d 387 (1961).
161d. at 23, 175 N.E.2d at 390.
51Id. at 22. 175 N.E.2d at 389.
58 1. at 22-23. 175 N.E.2d at 389.
59 1d. at 22, 175 N.E.2d at 389.
60 1d. at 23. 175 N.E.2d at 390.
61 State v. Marti. 290 N.W.2d 570. 583 (Iowa 1980).
62 1d. at 575.
63 1d. at 583.
64 1d. at 582.
651d. at 584.
66See, e.g., Grace v. State, 44 Tex. Crim 193, 69 S.W. 529 (1902); People v. Cambell, 124 Mich. App.
333, 335 N.W.2d 27 (1983) (rejecting People v. Roberts, 211 Mich. 187, 178 N.W. 690 (1920)).
67 Sanders v. State, 54 Tex. Crim. 101, 108-110, 112 S.W. 68, 72-73 (1908), overruled on other grounds,
Aven v. State, 102 Tex. Crim 478, 277 SW. 1080 (1925)).
61ld. at 109, 112 S.W. at 72-73.
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Participating in a suicide pact is part suicide, which is not illegal, and part
aiding or causing suicide, which most states consider criminal. Joining a suicide
pact differs from suicide, because it provides support and encouragement to
other pact members to carry through with their suicidal plans. Still, a suicide
pact survivor differs from one who aids or causes suicide, because the sur-
vivor could have also been a potential victim6 9
A suicide pact does not excuse the defendant who actually performs the
act which causes death, such as shooting, stabbing, poisoning or drowning the
victim.7° In the landmark case of People v. Matlock, 7 the California Supreme
Court held that a defendant who actively performed the lethal act was guilty
of murder, and thus was not entitled to jury instructions on the lesser included
offense of aiding and abetting suicide 72
At first blush, the reasons against punishing single suicide survivors would
seem to apply to suicide pact survivors.73 Yet, upon a more thorough analysis,
one sees that suicide pacts are more than multiple independent suicides. The
rationale for punishing suicide pact survivors stems from the encouragement
and support a suicide victim derives from the pact.74 The suicide pact member
relies on the other members' resolve to kill themselves.75 In State v. Webb, 76
a couple entered into a suicide pact, but the husband later told his wife that
he changed his mind? 7 Nonetheless, the wife shot the husband and then herself!
8
The lower court convicted the husband of manslaughter 9 That court charged
the jury that the defendant was guilty unless the husband knew for sure that
the wife abandoned the suicide pact when the husband reneged, and acted on
her own sole volition when she killed herself.8 0 The Supreme held that the lower
court's charge was erroneous, since it ignored the defendant's right to renounce
his suicidal plan, and wrongly placed upon the defendant the burden of
establishing his own innocence. 8'
Lawmakers advance other reasons for punishing suicide pact survivors.
69 See generally Markson, supra note 21.
70 State v. Bouse, 199 Or. 676, 702-03, 264 P.2d 800. 812 (1953), overruled on other grounds, State v.
Fischer. 232 Or. 558, 376 P.2d 418 (1962).
'151 Cal.2d 682. 694. 336 P.2d 505. 511 (1959).
7
-Id. at 694, 336 P.2d at 511.
''Markson. supra note 21, at 479.
-4Brenner. supra note 16, at 85.
751d.
76 State v. Webb, 216 Mo. 378, 115 S.W. 998 (1909).
171d. at 385. 115 S.W. at 1000.
781d.
"Id. at 383, 115 S.W. at 999.
'Old. at 386. 115 S.W. at 1000.
II Id. at 390, 115 S.W. at 1001.
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The mere fact that one pact member survives, or reneges on the agreement,
suggests that the survivor may have entered the pact in bad faith.8 2 One could
feign interest in a suicide pact with the sole intent to cause another's death.
California courts have examined the issue of unequal resolve to commit
suicide among pact members. In People v. Matlock, 83 the California Supreme
Court attached different criminal liability to defendants depending on whether
they took active or passive roles in the suicide.8 4 In In Re Joseph G., 85 the
same court refused to ritualistically apply the Matlock holding to suicide pact
situations.86 The defendant in Joseph G. was a minor suicide pact survivor who
drove a car off a cliff, resulting in another pact member's death.8 7 Although
the deceased's death proximately resulted from the defendant's act, the court
held that the defendant was guilty of aiding and abetting suicide rather than
murder.88 It reasoned that both suicide participants agreed to commit suicide
using the same instrumentality, namely driving the car off the cliff9 The driver's
intent to commit suicide was as sincere as the passenger's.90 The driver sur-
vived only because of a fluke, not because he entered the pact in bad faith.9 '
Thus, the court felt that the traditional reasons for convicting a suicide pact
survivor of murder did not apply when suicides are undertaken together using
a single instrumentality 2
IMPLICATIONS OF THE SAGE DECISION
Prior to the Sage decision, lawyer's found it difficult to discern Ohio's stance
on suicide related acts. In deciding Sage, the Ohio Supreme Court correctly
disregarded the Blackburn decision and turned to the Ohio Revised Code for
guidance? 3 After this, the court's logic deteriorated.
True, suicide is no crime in Ohio. Yet the court's next conclusion, that
acts that aid and abet suicide are not criminal, is unsubstantiated. No Ohio
statute specifically uses the words "aid and abet suicide." Still, acts performed
in the course of aiding and abetting suicide may well fall under those acts pro-
82 Brenner, supra note 16, at 86.
8351 Cal. 2d 682, 336 P.2d 505 (1959).
841d. at 694, 336 P.2d at 511. The court held that defendants who furnish means of suicide are guilty of
aiding suicide. Those who's actions actually cause the victim's death are guilty of murder. Matlock did
not involve a suicide pact.
8534 Cal 3d. 429, 667 P.2d 1176, 194 Cal. Rptr. 163 (1983).
86 1d. at 441, 667 P.2d at 1180-81, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
87 d. at 433-34, 667 P.2d at 1178, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 164-65.
811d. at 440-41, P.2d at 1182-83, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91/d. at 441, 667 P.2d at 1180-81, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
921d
.
930.R.C. § 2901.03 (A) (Baldwin 1987) abrogates common law offenses. Unless the code defines an of-
fense as a crime, it is no crime.
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hibited under other Ohio statutes? 4 One who strongly encourages an incompe-
tent or unstable person to commit suicide could feasibly "cause the death of
another" within the meaning of Ohio Revised Code Sections 2903.01 (aggravated
murder), 2903.02 (murder), 2903.03 (voluntary manslaughter), 2903.04 (in-
voluntary manslaughter) or 2903.05 (negligent homicide). 5
Although the Blackburn decision no longer represents Ohio law9 6 the court's
reasoning remains valid. When Blackburn was decided, there was no Ohio law
which expressly prohibited aiding and abetting suicide9 7 Yet, the Blackburn
court correctly reasoned that a defendant could be convicted of administering
poison, even though he did so in the course of aiding and abetting suicide9 8
Other jurisdictions convict defendants for crimes performed in the course of
aiding and abetting suicide, in the absence of aiding and abetting suicide
statutes 9
Suppose a couple enters into a pact, where a man agrees to shoot and kill
his wife, and then commit suicide. Both partners sincerely intend to go through
with the plan, and both voluntarily concur. The man shoots his wife, who dies.
He then shoots himself and survives. Conceivably, this man may have violated
Section 2903.01 of the Ohio Revised Code, by "purposely, and with prior calcula-
tion and design, caus[ing] the death of another." 100 The Ohio Supreme Court
failed to address this issue. The court held that the existence of a mutual suicide
pact is a complete defense to aggravated murder.'0 ' It did not distinguish be-
tween suicide pacts where each member agrees to commit suicide, and suicide-
murder pacts where one person agrees to commit suicide and the other person
consents to murder.'02
On the surface, the Sage holding appears to favor defendants who assert
the suicide defense. The holding represents just the opposite. By saying that
94 See discussion below regarding how one's participation in a suicide-murder pact may be prohibited under
Section 2903.01 of the Ohio Revised Code.
95 See, e.g., Persampieri v. Commonwealth, 343 Mass. 19, 175 N.E.2d 387 (1961) and State v. Marti, 290
N.W.2d 570 (Iowa 1980) where other jurisdictions held that defendants who recklessly encouraged suicide
"caused" the victims' deaths, and thus were guilty of involuntary manslaughter.
96 See note 93.
97Blackburn, 23 Ohio St. at 163.
981d. at 163-64.
99 See, e.g., People v. Roberts, 211 Mich 187, 178 N.W. 690 (1920); Aven v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. 478,
277 SW. 1080 (1925) (where defendants were convicted of administering poison to their wives) and Per-
sampieri v. Commonwealth, 343 Mass. 19, 175 N.E.2d 387 (1961); State v. Marti, 290 N.W.2d 570 (Iowa
1980) (where the courts felt the defendants' reckless behavior caused the victims' death, and thus fell under
the states' involuntary manslaughter statutes).
100 See O.R.C. § 2903.01 (A) (Baldwin 1987). See also People v. Matlock, 51 Cal. 2d 682, 336 P.2d 505
(1959) for a similar line of reasoning from the California Supreme Court.
101 Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d at 179, 510 N.E.2d at 347.
10 2 See the following cases which distinguish between defendants who take an active role and those who
take passive roles in aiding and abetting suicide. People v. Matlock, 51 Cal. 2d 682, 336 P.2d 505 (1959);
In Re Joseph G., 34 Cal. 3d 429, 667 P.2d 1176, 194 Cal. Rptr. 163 (1983).
[Vol. 21:2
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a mutual suicide pact acts as a complete defense to criminal liability, the court
conveniently rationalized the trial court's refusal to charge on a lesser included
offense. Hence, Sage was either guilty of aggravated murder or nothing at all.
A jury's decision may better match the evidence when the jury receives in-
structions on both aggravated murder and a lesser included offense. Juries faced
with an "all or nothing" aggravated murder instruction may be tempted to wrong-
ly convict a suicide pact survivor with aggravated murder, rather than see a
suspicious defendant set free.'0 3
Under Ohio's aggravated murder statute,'0 4 there is no liability when two
people each voluntarily take their own lives. That statute prohibits causing an-
other's death, not causing one's own death. 0 5 However, one can cause another's
death by forcing that person to commit suicide, and thus commit aggravated
murder.0 6 The Sage court was correct to emphasize that a suicide pact must
be mutual to act as a complete defense to aggravated murder. Unfortunately,
the Ohio legislature offers little guidance in this area. Virtually all Ohio homicide
statutes require that the defendant "cause the death of another" to impose criminal
liability. 0 7 At some point encouraging another's suicide may cause another's
death.
Perhaps this paradox requires legislative action. As discussed earlier, there
are several good reasons to punish those who aid and abet suicide, including
those who offer support through suicide pacts. Yet the punishment should fit
the crime. Aiding and abetting suicide should not be punished as severely as
murder. Until the legislature acts, courts should be cautious in applying the
Sage holding to other aiding and abetting suicide cases. The suicide pact defense
should be limited to those cases where all members entered into the pact volun-
tarily, and the pact involves agreements to commit suicide. Never should the
existence of a suicide pact act as a defense in the suicide-murder situation, where
one member consents to murder.
CONCLUSION
State v. Sage ' 08 represents the Ohio Supreme Court's most recent stance
on the treatment of suicide pact survivors. The court held that the existence
of a mutual suicide pact acts as a complete defense to criminal liability.0 9 Future
10 3 See generally V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY. 131-48 (1986) for a discussion of how subjec-
tive prejudice affects the jury's verdict. See also R. LEMPART & S. SALTZBURG. A MODERN APPROACH TO
EVIDENCE. 162-65 (1984) for a discussion about how jurors feel less regret for convicting a defendant whom
they perceive to be basically evil, regardless of how the facts fit the presented jury instructions.
1040.R.C. § 2903.01 (A) (Baldwin 1987).
i5 Id.
106See, e.g., Bowen, 13 Mass. 356; Brenner, supra note 16.
1°7See O.R.C. §§ 2903.01, 2903.02, 2903.03, 2903.04, 2903.05, 2906.06, and 2903.07 (Baldwin 1987).
08Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d at 174, 510 N.E.2d at 343.
109 1d. at 179, 510 N.E.2d at 347.
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courts must be cautious when applying the Sage holding to other fact patterns.
The court's opinion limits the suicide pact defense to situations involving mutual
suicide pacts where all members agree to commit suicide. It does not excuse
murder by consent.
The Sage decision places Ohio in the minority of states who do not im-
pose criminal sanctions for aiding and abetting suicide. Perhaps, the Ohio
Legislature should consider enacting a statute prohibiting aiding and abetting
suicide, providing graduated punishments that correlate with the offender's
culpability. Although many valid reasons exist against punishing suicide, the
same reasons rarely apply to one who encourages another's suicide.
DIANA M. KEATING
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